The boy and his microscope: Interpreting section 56(1) of the National Health Act by Jordaan, DW
Part 1: Ambiguity and common-law 
presumptions
1. Introduction
How does the classic conflict between freedom and propriety play 
itself out in the contemporary South African legal system? I do not 
attempt a general answer, but focus this article on one particular 
issue: the use of human gametes – sperm and egg cells. I pose the 
following question: Is it legal to use one’s own gametes, or others’ 
gametes with their consent, for non-medical and non-sexual-inter-
course purposes? (Such possible purposes are plentiful, which I 
leave to the reader’s imagination.) Using gametes for one’s own 
purposes is admittedly not the most pressing social or legal prob-
lem facing our country; yet, as a matter of principle, this issue may 
be a test case for how deep our country’s commitment to freedom 
really runs. In the memorable words of Mill, freedom entails ‘do-
ing as we like … without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so 
long as what we do does not harm them even though they should 
think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong’ (my emphasis).1
What does the law say about non-medical, non-sexual-inter-
course gamete use? The relevant statutory provision is section 
56(1) of the National Heath Act.2 In this article, I argue that the for-
mulation of section 56(1) is ambiguous and admits of two possible 
meanings with vastly different consequences upon freedom. My 
arguments regarding the interpretation of section 56(1) are pre-
sented in two parts: Part 1 introduces the ambiguity in the Act and 
focuses on the traditional common law presumptions of statutory 
interpretation; and Part 2 analyses the human rights dimensions of 
section 56(1) and concludes with a suggested interpretation.
It should be noted that Chapter 8 of the Act, which includes sec-
tion 56(1), has not yet taken effect: only once regulations relating 
to this chapter have been finalised, will this chapter be signed into 
effect by the President.3 Several draft regulations relating to Chap-
ter 8 have been published for public comment since the beginning 
of 2007.4-6
2. Ambiguous formulation
Section 56(1) of the Act provides the following regarding the use 
of gametes:
 A person may use … gametes removed … from a living per-
son only for such medical or dental purposes as may be pre-
scribed.
Section 1 of the Act defines ‘prescribed’ as meaning ‘prescribed 
by regulation’. What is clear is that section 56(1) is only applicable 
to gametes outside the body, and is therefore not applicable to the 
use (as a necessary consequence) of gametes for the purpose of 
sexual intercourse. What is not clear, however, is whether gametes 
outside the human body may only be used for medical or dental 
purposes, or whether this section only applies to the kinds of medi-
cal and dental purposes that such gametes may be used for, and it 
therefore does not apply to the use of such gametes for non-medi-
cal purposes. The qualification ‘medical or dental’ renders the sen-
tence a classic textbook example of ambiguity: does ‘medical or 
dental’ qualify (i) the prescription, i.e. that the regulations are only 
intended to prescribe within the parameters of medical and dental 
use and that use outside those parameters is per implication not 
prescribed and hence permissible (the restrictive interpretation); or 
does it qualify (ii) use, i.e. that use is confined to medical or dental 
use on a general level and that the regulations will be an additional 
layer of specific limitations (the extensive interpretation)?
If the intention of the legislature were the restrictive interpreta-
tion, the following clearer formulation is proposed: ‘A person may 
use … gametes removed … from a living person, where such use 
is for medical or dental purposes, only as prescribed’. If, however, 
the intention of the legislature were the extensive interpretation, 
a clearer formulation of such intention would have been: ‘A per-
son may use … gametes removed … from a living person only for 
medical or dental purposes, and only as prescribed’.
The nomenclature of purported medical or dental purposes 
that are prescribed by the draft Regulations on diagnostic testing, 
health research and therapeutics do not assist in solving the am-
biguity – in fact, the formulation of the phrase ‘may be removed or 
withdrawn from living persons and used for the following specific 
medical and dental purposes’ is similarly open to ambiguous inter-
pretation. Regulation 4 reads as follows:
 DNA, RNA, cultured cells, amniocytes, stem cells, gametes, 
polar bodies, blastomeres and small tissue biopsies including 
single cells from developing blastocysts, may be removed or 
withdrawn from living persons and used for the following specific 
medical and dental purposes –
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(a)    DNA, RNA and chromosome-based genetic testing includ-
ing:
(i)   diagnostic tests;
(ii)  testing for genetic carrier status;
(iii)  antenatal diagnosis;
(iv)   voluntary presymptomatic, predictive or susceptibility 
testing, screening tests, drug response or toxicity tests, 
identity or paternity testing;
(v)   tests that are performed post-natally;
(vi)   preimplantation DNA tests to be carried out on a polar 
body of an ovum, in order to ensure that an ovum that 
does not carry a mutation that causes a serious genetic 
condition can be selected for in vitro fertilisation;
(vii)  preimplantation DNA tests following the removal of a polar 
body or one or two blastomeres of a developing embryo 
can be carried out for the purpose of ensuring implanta-
tion of an embryo, without a mutation that causes a seri-
ous genetic condition;
(b)  health research referred to in section 69(3) of the Act; or
(c)   studies of archaeological, medical or heritage value on DNA 
obtained from human genetic material, conducted in terms 
of the of the National Heritage Resources Act, 1999 (Act No. 
25 of 1999).
The draft Regulations on artificial fertilisation only deal with the 
use of gametes for the purpose of artificial fertilisation and there-
fore do not provide further insight into the meaning of section 
56(1).
3. The boy and his microscope: a hypothetical case 
study
To practically illustrate the legal implications of the two possible 
interpretations, I employ a hypothetical case study: A 14-year-old 
boy, whose favourite subject at school is biology, is given a micro-
scope as a present. Alone in his room, he decides to take some of 
his sperm and look at it under the microscope. He does this purely 
out of curiosity, with no medical or dental purpose in mind. I submit 
that there is certainly an element of use, the object of which is 
removed gametes; further, that it would be a highly strained argu-
ment to aver that the boy’s actions are for medical or dental pur-
poses, since it is neither the subjective intention of his actions nor 
does he have the level of medical or dental knowledge that would 
reasonably be expected of someone who engages in research for 
medical or dental purposes.
•    Assuming the restrictive interpretation: the boy’s experiments 
would fall outside the ambit of section 56(1) and would hence 
not constitute a contravention of the Act.
•    Assuming the extensive interpretation: the boy would be guilty 
of contravening section 56(1) of the Act. Note that even if ‘medi-
cal or dental purposes’ are given an outrageously broad inter-
pretation to include the boy’s actions (which is contrary to my 
submission, but goes to prove the point that under the extensive 
interpretation the boy would be guilty regardless), they would 
fall outside the draft Regulations’ nomenclature of allowed uses, 
therefore making him guilty of contravening section 56(1) of 
the Act; he would secondly also be in contravention of section 
56(2)(a)(iii) of the Act, which states that gametes may not be 
removed from persons under the age of 18 for the purposes of 
section 56(1).
This case study can easily be expanded on: fascinated by this 
new living microscopic world, the boy starts conducting simple 
experiments with his sperm, such as adding common household 
chemicals and studying their reaction and how long they survive. 
The boy’s friends – all of his age and educational level – begin to 
take a keen interest in his experiments, and provide sperm for the 
experiments that they conduct under the microscope.
•    Assuming the restrictive interpretation: similar to the initial case 
study, the boy and his friends’ experiments would fall outside 
the ambit of section 56(1) and would hence not constitute a con-
travention of the Act.
•    Assuming the extensive interpretation: all the boys would be in 
contravention of section 56(1). Similar to the initial case study, 
should ‘medical or dental purposes’ be construed to include 
the boys’ actions, they would all be in contravention of sections 
56(1) and 56(2)(a)(iii) of the Act.
The case study of the boy and his microscope and its alternative 
legal implications will, in the subsequent analyses, serve as a ref-
erence to illustrate the abstract concepts of the Act in an applied, 
concrete manner.
4. De minimis?
At this point, with the case study freshly in mind, we need to ad-
dress the question of whether the whole subject of non-medical, 
non-sexual-intercourse uses of gametes is not a matter so incon-
sequential that it should just be dismissed as a triviality according 
to the maxim De minimis non curat lex (The law does not concern 
itself with trifles.). I argue that the application of de minimis is as a 
matter of principle not appropriate and, moreover, offers all but a 
certain outcome in practice.
Firstly, what is at stake here is the principle of freedom. If freedom 
– however trivial the particular freedom may seem to the observer 
– is to be limited by law, there must be reasonable justification. 
If we are to sweep the subject of non-medical, non-sexual-inter-
course uses of gametes under the carpet of de minimis, we not 
only devalue the principle of freedom but also create a dangerous 
precedent: to avoid confronting and dealing with principles (such 
as freedom and its legitimate sphere) but rather opt for apparently 
expedient solutions (such as categorising a freedom as trivial and 
calling upon de minimis). De minimis is not a proper defender of 
freedom.
Although the principle argument is sufficient to rule out de mini-
mis as a solution to the legal position of non-medical, non-sexual-
intercourse uses of gametes, it can in addition also be argued that, 
on a practical level, de minimis offers a very uncertain solution. 
Judging by case law history, the chance of successfully arguing 
for the application of the de minimis maxim in the case of statutory 
offences is slim: although the maxim has been argued with varying 
degrees of success in cases dealing with common law crimes,7-10 
our courts in the case of statutory crimes have been consistently 
reluctant to apply the maxim.11-17 If case law proves anything, it is 
that there is a distinct possibility that the state may prosecute for 
trivialities and likewise that especially the lower courts will pass 
guilty judgements in such cases.
On a legal comparative note, it has been established as a general 
rule in American law that the de minimis maxim will not excuse tri-
fling irregularities in complying with statutory requirements.18(p168),19-20 
With reference to contemporary Dutch law, Labuschagne has sug-
gested that triviality should only impinge on sentencing and not on 
guilt.21
All of the above considered, applying de minimis firstly avoids 
addressing the principle at stake, and secondly does not offer a 
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sure escape from the criminal law implications of contravening the 
Act, should the extensive interpretation of section 56(1) be adopt-
ed. Our journey to find an answer to the question posed at the be-
ginning of this article – Is it legal to use gametes for non-medical, 
non-sexual-intercourse purposes? – therefore continues.
5. The common law presumptions of interpretation
In cases of statutory ambiguity such as the present, the common 
law presumptions of interpretation are called in aid.22 Although 
some commentators23,24 have expressed pessimistic views regard-
ing the future of the presumptions in the new constitutional dis-
pensation, arguing that the presumptions have ‘now largely been 
supplanted’ by the Constitution in general and the Bill of Rights 
in particular,25 De Ville suggests that the courts’ reliance on the 
presumptions in statutory interpretation has not visibly declined 
since the onset of the new constitutional dispensation.25(p166) It 
should be noted that, although the Constitutional Court has on oc-
casion expressed the opinion (per Sachs J) that ‘a question mark 
has to be placed over the usefulness of common law presump-
tions in interpreting the Constitution’,26(para115) no such reservation 
has been expressed regarding the role of the presumptions in 
statutory interpretation.27(p152) I therefore agree with Du Plessis’ 
submission27(p153) that the presumptions could still fulfil a number of 
useful functions, of which the following are of relevance to our cur-
rent project: (i) They can supplement, facilitate and mediate resort 
to constitutional values in statutory interpretation, in accordance 
with the requirements of Section 39(2) of the Constitution; (ii) they 
can advance values that are implicit in the Constitution; and (iii) 
they can amplify values that are, although explicit in the Constitu-
tion, fragmented.
In the following analysis, I consider the following presumptions:
•    that statute law is not unjust, inequitable and unreasonable; 
and
•    that the legislature does not intend to alter the existing law more 
than necessary.
5.1 The presumption that statute law is not unjust, inequitable 
and unreasonable
This presumption is well established in our law and is still relied 
on by courts in the new constitutional era.28-31 Du Plessis submits, 
however, that the Constitution can be perceived as a codification 
of the values of justice, equity and reasonableness as they are 
encountered in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom; and that the more specific and clear-
ly articulated provisions of the Constitution have subsumed much 
of the presumption.27(p155) He therefore suggests that:
 At present the ‘clear language’ of the statute cannot trump the 
Constitution, and constitutional jurisprudence on many exigen-
cies for which the presumption has traditionally catered, is force-
ful and to the point. In these instances it is desirable that consti-
tutional provisions, as expounded in the case law, take the place 
of the presumption.
In the light of the ambiguous formulation of section 56(1) – the 
lack of ‘clear language’ – I submit that reliance on the presumption 
is suitable. This will be complemented in Part 2 of this article by 
a comprehensive human rights (constitutional) analysis of section 
56(1).
Two specific applications of this presumption are relevant to our 
present project, namely (i) onerous provisions and (ii) preference 
for the most beneficial interpretation, as elaborated on below.
5.1.1 Onerous provisions
What are the criminal law implications of section 56(1) – what would 
be the penal consequences of the boys’ actions if the extensive 
interpretation of section 56(1) is followed? In contrast with section 
57, which deals with human cloning, that creates a criminal norm 
(for example: ‘act X constitutes an offence’) and criminal sanction 
(for example: ‘offence X is liable on conviction to imprisonment for 
a period of Y years’), section 56 provides for neither; it only creates 
a legal norm. Contravention of section 56(1) per se would there-
fore not be a criminal offence.32-35 The Act does, however, make 
provision for the appointment of so-called health officers (section 
80) who have the duty to monitor and enforce compliance with 
the Act (section 81). Contravention of the legal norm created by 
section 56(1) would therefore expose a person to administrative 
action by a health officer, who could issue a compliance notice to 
such a person. Should the person who is in contravention of sec-
tion 56(1) fail to comply with the compliance notice, such person 
would be guilty of an offence (section 89(1)(f)) and liable to a fine 
or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years or to both 
a fine and such imprisonment (section 89(2). The valid execution 
of a prior, very specific administrative act by the State is therefore 
a conditio sine qua non for each instance of enforcement of sec-
tion 56(1). Therefore: the boys in the case study can be exposed 
to administrative action by a health officer and, should they still 
persist, they would be criminally prosecuted.
Since section 56(1) has a penal nature, the common law maxim 
In poenis strictissima verborum significatio accipiendi est (‘in the 
case of penal laws, the strictest interpretation of their terms should 
be accepted’) is applicable.36-43 This maxim very clearly determines 
in favour of the restrictive interpretation of section 56(1).
5.1.2 Preference for the most beneficial interpretation
The common law maxim Semper in dubiis benigniora praeferenda 
sunt (‘in cases of doubt, the most beneficial interpretations are to 
be preferred’) suggests the same result:44-50 with reference to the 
case study of the boy and his microscope, it should be clear that 
the restrictive interpretation which allows the boy to conduct his 
experiments is the most beneficial interpretation of section 56(1). 
The Court states it clearly in Rossouw v. Sachs:51-56
 If a statute is couched in ambiguous language, the court will 
give it the meaning which least interferes with the liberty of the 
individual.
5.1.3 Conclusion
I therefore submit that the presumption that statute law is not un-
just, inequitable and unreasonable clearly favours the restrictive 
interpretation of section 56(1), namely that, outside the sphere of 
use for medical or dental purposes, the use of gametes is not pro-
hibited, in contrast with the extensive interpretation that prohibits 
all uses of gametes, such as the boy’s experiments in our case 
study.
5.2 The presumption that the legislature does not intend to 
alter the existing law more than necessary
Let us now consider the applicability of the presumption that the 
legislature does not intend to alter the existing law more than nec-
essary. The purpose of this presumption is to enhance legal cer-
tainty57 and has been described as the ‘most fundamental of all 
the presumptions’.58(p159),59,60 The ‘existing law’ may of course be 
either common law or statute law. In the present case, the Act was 
preceded by a number of statutes; the statute that pertains to sec-
tion 56(1) specifically is the Human Tissue Act.61 Section 19 of the 
Human Tissue Act states that:
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 Any … gamete removed or withdrawn from the body of a living 
person shall, subject to the regulations, only be used for medical 
or dental purposes …  
The position of the Human Tissue Act is clearly similar to the ex-
tensive interpretation of section 56(1) and could therefore be used 
to argue for such interpretation. Such an argument would however 
be critically flawed, as it would confuse preceding law with existing 
law. The nature of the presumption, insofar as it relates to statute 
law which is the current case, was explained as follows in Kent NO 
v. South African Railways and Harbours and Another:62-68
 [I]t is necessary to bear in mind a well-known principle of statu-
tory interpretation, viz. that statutes must be read together and 
the later one must not be so construed as to repeal the provision 
of an earlier one, or to take away rights conferred by an earlier 
one unless the later statute expressly alters the provisions of the 
earlier one in that respect or such alteration is a necessary infer-
ence from the terms of the later statute. The inference must be a 
necessary one and not merely a possible one [my emphasis].
This is not a case where statutes can be ‘read together’ – the 
Human Tissue Act was in fact explicitly repealed by the National 
Health Act (section 93). Once the regulations are promulgated and 
section 56(1) comes into force, the Human Tissue Act will cease 
to be law; the Human Tissue Act can therefore not be ‘existing law’ 
for the purposes of the presumption that the legislature does not 
intend to alter the existing law more than necessary, rendering this 
presumption not applicable to the interpretation of section 56(1).
Prefacing my subsequent human rights analysis of section 
56(1), a reference to Du Plessis’ submission regarding the present 
presumption might be noteworthy: Du Plessis opines that, under 
the Constitution, the ‘necessary’ element of the presumption has 
become a concept different to what it used to be – that ‘necessary’ 
has now acquired a meaning equivalent to ‘required to be in line 
with the Constitution’. This interpretation of the ‘necessary’ ele-
ment of the presumption therefore creates the opportunity to use 
this common law artefact to promote the values of the Constitu-
tion and prevents it from impeding the advance of these values by 
entrenching existing (probably pre-constitutional) law. Du Plessis 
states his position as follows:27(p181)
 [I]f the maximisation of the [existing] law through statutory inter-
pretation comes to a result at odds with the Constitution, there 
can be no question: it is necessary to interpret the statute in a 
manner altering the [existing] law … [W]hen a statute dealing 
with the exercise of public power is construed, it is necessary 
that the [existing] law does not enjoy any possible ‘advantage’ 
that the conventional presumption could afford it. [my empha-
sis]
Anticipating the (apparent) conclusion of the subsequent human 
rights analysis that the extensive interpretation of section 56(1) 
– and hence also its equivalent in section 19 of the Human Tis-
sue Act – would be unconstitutional, it is therefore according to 
Du Plessis necessary to interpret section 56(1) in a manner alter-
ing the previous position as per the Human Tissue Act; moreover, 
since section 56(1) deals with the exercise of public power, it is 
necessary that the hypothetical existing law (which does not even 
exist in the present case) does not enjoy any possible advantage 
that the conventional presumption could afford it.
5.3 Conclusion on the presumptions
In the analysis of common law presumptions, I have considered 
two presumptions that ex facie seemed to be relevant: (i) the pre-
sumption that statute law is not unjust, inequitable and unreason-
able clearly indicated the restrictive interpretation of section 56(1); 
and (ii) the presumption that the legislature does not intend to alter 
the existing law more than necessary was indicated to be not rel-
evant since it requires existing law, which is lacking in the present 
case. It must therefore be concluded that the common law pre-
sumptions of interpretation determine that the restrictive interpre-
tation of section 56(1) must be adopted; namely, that outside the 
sphere of use for medical or dental purposes, the use of gametes 
is not prohibited.
This conclusion of the traditional common law analysis ends 
Part 1. However, our constitutional dispensation requires a new 
dimension to statutory interpretation; namely, the promotion of hu-
man rights, which will be the focus of Part 2.
Part 2: The human rights dimensions
6. The human rights dimensions of section 56(1)
Section 39(2) of the Constitution69 places a general duty on the 
court, when interpreting any legislation, to promote the spirit, pur-
port and objects of the Bill of Rights. This duty applies irrespective 
of whether any of the parties to the litigation raised or relied on 
any section of the Bill.70 De Ville suggests that the constitutional 
era has supplemented the nomenclature of common law presump-
tions of interpretation with a new presumption of interpretation: the 
presumption that a statute is constitutional.25(p223)
What are the human rights dimensions of section 56(1) of the 
National Health Act? In the following, I argue that the extensive 
interpretation of section 56(1) infringes on at least one constitu-
tionally guaranteed right, namely that of privacy (section 14 of the 
Constitution), and that such infringement will not be justifiable in 
terms of the limitation clause (section 36 of the Constitution); the 
restrictive interpretation, in contrast, does not constitute any such 
infringement.
6.1 Interpreting privacy
South African case law has interpreted the right to privacy as (i) 
admitting to degrees of protection depending on proximity of the 
relevant interest to the personal in contrast with the communal 
sphere; and (ii) largely instrumental in achieving further values 
– primarily, human dignity. A comprehensive basis for this inter-
pretation was laid in Bernstein v. Bester NO.71 Ackermann J, for 
the majority of the court, defined the scope of privacy to those 
aspects in regard to which a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ can 
be harboured. This ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ consists of 
both a subjective expectation of privacy as well as a component 
of objective reasonableness.71(para75) A useful ‘tool’ to ascertain the 
reasonableness is the ‘continuum of privacy interests’ (coined by 
Sachs J in Mistry72(para27)) that has been explained in Bernstein as 
follows:71(para67)
 Privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal realm, but as a 
person moves into communal relations and activities such as 
business and social interaction, the scope of personal space 
shrinks accordingly.
The continuum-of-privacy-interests doctrine therefore estab-
lishes a direct correlation between the proximity of an interest to 
the personal sphere and the degree of protection it will be afforded 
under the right to privacy.
As Currie and De Waal point out, the continuum-of-privacy-inter-
ests doctrine does not completely flesh out the concept of reason-
ableness, and the concept of reasonableness needs to be linked 
to other values against which to measure it.73(p318) On this concep-
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tion, the protection of privacy does not have intrinsic value, but 
serves an instrumental function in promoting these other values 
that are the measure of reasonableness.73(p319) In Bernstein, this 
end-value is articulated as ‘one’s own autonomous identity’.71(para65) 
In the subsequent Hyundai Motor Manufacturers, ‘autonomous 
identity’ is substituted for the more conventional value of ‘human 
dignity’.74(para18) The two concepts of ‘identity’ and ‘human dignity’ 
are of course very closely linked: The German Constitutional Court 
has in its interpretation of the meaning of human dignity specifi-
cally included ‘own identity’ as a constituent element.75 The con-
cept substitution of ‘autonomous identity’ with ‘human dignity’ qua 
end-value in Hyundai must therefore be seen as substance broad-
ening of privacy’s end-value rather than substance substitution: 
‘human dignity’ includes the original concept ‘autonomous identity’ 
qua constituent element.
Human dignity qua end-value of privacy requires more attention: 
Another key element of human dignity (besides identity) that is of 
particular relevance to our current project is individual autonomy 
– South African constitutional scholar Haysom identifies individual 
autonomy as (i) a key element of human dignity, and (ii) instrumen-
tal in achieving a further value integral to human dignity, namely 
individual self-actualisation.76(p131,138) Individual autonomy and self-
actualisation can therefore qua constituent elements of human 
dignity, serve as specific measures of the reasonableness of a 
subjective expectation of privacy, and hence of the legitimacy of 
the privacy expectation. A direct conceptual nexus between priva-
cy and individual autonomy was established by the Constitutional 
Court in the recent high-profile case of NM v. Smith:77 Madala J, for 
the majority of the court, observed that ‘Privacy encompasses the 
right of a person to live his or her life as he or she pleases’,77(para33) 
and also that ‘the nature and the scope of the right envisage a 
concept of the right to be left alone’.77(para32)
Beyond South African case law, values other than human dignity 
have also been suggested as end-values of privacy. The concep-
tion of privacy as an instrumental right that serves other end-val-
ues is common in international jurisprudence. Edmundson identi-
fies several such end-values, inter alia: inquiry; learning, creativity 
and relaxation; personhood and moral ownership of one’s body.78
Now, to apply the theory to our case study of the boy and his 
microscope, I submit that the boy’s interest in conducting his ex-
periments is located very proximate to the core of the personal 
sphere on the continuum-of-privacy interests. In general, what you 
study under your own microscope in the privacy of your own home 
should fall squarely within the protection of privacy. The fact that 
the object of the study is the boy’s own sperm makes the case 
for privacy protection even stronger. The objective moral impor-
tance and personal nature of any male’s sperm to himself should 
be apparent and is in my observation widely acknowledged in our 
society: sperm (i) originate in the body; (ii) become distinct from 
the body through – and are therefore associated with – the very 
intimate act of sex; (iii) are the designated carriers of one’s genetic 
heritage; and (iv) represent the means to creating a family of one’s 
own. One’s body, sex, one’s genetic heritage, and one’s family are 
all deeply personal matters. The use of one’s sperm is certainly a 
personal matter – certainly within the ‘inner sanctum of a person’, 
to cite Ackermann J in Bernstein.71(para67)
When privacy is approached as an instrumental right, I submit 
that the boy’s interest in conducting his experiments is intimately 
linked with human dignity qua end-value of privacy: the experi-
ments are an expression of curiosity, exploration and discovery, 
hence contributing to the development of an autonomous identity; 
moreover, the experiments are an expression of individual autono-
my that contributes to self-actualisation by answering and feeding 
the boy’s fascination with microscopic life. The boy’s actions are 
therefore strongly dignity-affirming.
When we turn to other possible end-values of privacy, the case 
for the boy’s interest in conducting his experiments to be afforded 
privacy protection grows even stronger:
•    Inquiry. The boy’s experiments are certainly not cutting-edge 
science, but are inquiry par excellence. As such, privacy protec-
tion will clearly serve this end-value.
•    Learning, creativity and relaxation. The boy may well teach 
himself quite a few things through his observations, such as 
how long sperm survive outside the human body. By occupying 
his time in this way – experimenting and learning – he will also 
be forming a habit of self-learning that may further contribute to 
his development of an autonomous identity.
•    Personhood and moral ownership of one’s body. The boy’s 
experiments with his own sperm are a confirmation of his moral 
ownership of his own body. Also in this case, privacy protection 
will clearly serve this end-value.
We have now analysed the case study of the boy and his micro-
scope from both the continuum-of-privacy-interests perspective 
and the instrumental perspective and must conclude that the boy’s 
interest in conducting his experiments clearly falls within the ambit 
of privacy protection. We shall now proceed to the next step, 
namely the expanded case study.
Is the inner sanctum compromised when the case study is ex-
panded to include the boy’s friends? I submit not. Similar to family 
life that can be shared by multiple individuals but still remains pri-
vate, so do the experiments by the boy and his friends. The fact 
that they are in the same (private) physical space when conduct-
ing the experiments instead of all acting in isolation is secondary 
to the personal nature of their activity. Sharing in this activity with 
a common goal may well contribute to fostering the friends’ inter-
personal relationships and hence touch on another end-value of 
privacy. The nurturing of human relationships has crystallised in 
our case law as a prominent aspect of privacy. Ackermann J ar-
ticulates it as follows in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian 
Equality v. Minister of Justice:79(para32)
 Privacy recognises that we all have a right to a sphere of private 
intimacy and autonomy which allows us to establish and nurture 
human relationships without interference from the outside com-
munity.
The value of establishing and nurturing human relationships has 
subsequently been used fruitfully by Sachs J and O’Regan J in 
their minority decision in S v. Jordan.80(para82) They posit the estab-
lishing and nurturing of human relationships as the end-value of 
privacy protection in the case of sexual relationships, and conse-
quently find that the sexual aspect of prostitution that would other-
wise qualify as being in the intensely personal sphere, falls ‘far 
away from the inner sanctum of protected privacy rights’, since sex 
for sale in the (impersonal) open market has nothing to do with 
establishing and nurturing human relationships.80(para83) The boys in 
the case study may be sharing in a personal experience, but they 
are clearly far removed from entering the impersonal sphere of 
‘strangers in the marketplace’ contemplated in S v. Jordan80(para83) 
(which could have been the case had they, for instance, sold their 
sperm on the open market). It must therefore be concluded that 
the inner sanctum of privacy protection is not compromised by the 
boy in the case study involving some of his friends in his experi-
ments; on the contrary, with the value of establishing and nurturing 
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human relationships that comes into play, arguably incidentally, 
the argument for privacy protection might even be strengthened.
It has already been established that, should the extensive inter-
pretation of section 56(1) be followed, the experiments performed 
by the boy (and his friends) in the case study would be prohibited; 
the restrictive interpretation does not cause such a ban. It has also 
now been concluded that the boy’s (and his friends’) interest in 
conducting his (their) experiments falls within the ambit of privacy 
protection. The extensive interpretation therefore constitutes an 
infringement on the right to privacy.
6.2 Limitation
Is it possible to justify the infringement on privacy that the extensive 
interpretation poses? This question must be answered with refer-
ence to the purpose of section 56(1), on which the Act is not clear: 
neither the Objects of the Act as per section 2, nor the Preface, 
refer to the use of gametes per se. The only purpose-related state-
ment in the Act that can potentially be made to bear on the use of 
gametes is the following extract from the Preface: the Act aims to 
‘establish a health system based on … internationally recognised 
standards of research and a spirit of enquiry and advocacy which 
encourages participation’. I will here deal with international stand-
ards and return to a spirit of enquiry in my conclusion.
6.2.1 International standards
I submit that the purpose of attaining internationally recognised 
standards of research cannot justify the limitation on privacy as 
per the extensive interpretation of section 56(1), which submission 
I will support with three distinct arguments: the causal nexus ar-
gument, the non-existence argument, and the relative importance 
argument.
6.2.1.1 The causal nexus argument
The first argument is essentially semantic and centres on the dif-
ference between ‘research’ and ‘use’. Although the two concepts 
overlap, ‘research’ is clearly a species of the genus ‘use’ and not 
vice versa; ‘research’ is therefore a specific kind of ‘use’, while the 
generic ‘use’ includes ‘research’, but also has a wider meaning 
and can include other conceivable ‘uses’ in the context of gametes, 
such as the creation of embryos for reproductive purposes. Seen 
against this background, the purpose of attaining internationally 
recognised standards of research has a far narrower, more spe-
cific, ambit than the limitation imposed by the extensive interpreta-
tion of section 56(1), which prohibits all non-medical and non-den-
tal uses of gametes. A complete causal connection between the 
limitation and its purpose is absent, as the limitation is significantly 
wider than its purpose. The limitation imposed by the extensive 
interpretation of section 56(1) therefore fails the test of the Bill of 
Rights’ limitation clause; the limitation on privacy imposed by the 
extensive interpretation cannot be justified.
One may wonder what the situation would have been if the pur-
pose were not formulated as narrowly as it is, but rather as ‘inter-
nationally recognised standards of the use of gametes’. My next 
two arguments each conclude that, even if this were the case, the 
limitation would still not be justifiable.
6.2.1.2 The non-existence argument
What is the substance of ‘internationally recognised standards of 
research’ – what do these international standards prescribe re-
garding the use of gametes? I submit that there is no international 
standard regarding the use of gametes: Firstly, at the echelon of 
international law, the relevant legal instrument (the Universal Dec-
laration on Bioethics and Human Rights) does not even mention 
gametes; secondly, at the echelon of foreign law, a reading of the 
comparative legislation of four comparative foreign jurisdictions 
gives a mixed result, further indicating the lack of any international 
standard:
•    The British Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990 
does not regulate the use of gametes in general. Only specific 
uses, namely cryopreservation (storage), mixing with animal 
gametes, and fertility treatment, are regulated.81,82(p1224,1246)
•    The Dutch Act of 20 June 200283 prohibits all uses of gametes 
for purposes other than the purposes specifically enumerated 
in the act.
•    The Belgian Act of 11 May 200384 has no general provision 
on the use of gametes – it only prohibits commercial use of 
gametes and specifically regulates the use of gametes to 
create embryos.
•    Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act of 2004 likewise 
does not prohibit the use of gametes in general, but does so in 
the case of gametes obtained from minors (with a minor exclu-
sion). The non-commercial use of gametes that are obtained 
from majors and that are not intended for creating embryos is 
not regulated.
The omission in international law and the divergence in foreign 
law render it impossible to conceive of internationally recognised 
standards regarding the use of gametes. The reference to interna-
tionally recognised standards in the preamble is not superfluous in 
the context of the Act as a whole: there are certainly internation-
ally recognised standards regarding other important aspects with 
which the Act deals, such as human reproductive cloning. But in 
the case of the use of gametes, the purpose of attaining interna-
tionally recognised standards of research is evidently meaningless 
and hence not applicable.
6.2.1.3 The relative importance argument
If, hypothetically, there were conflict between international law and 
a constitutionally guaranteed right, such as privacy in the present 
case, the constitutional right would in any case trump international 
law. In the Fourie case85 that dealt with same-sex marriage, the 
state opposed same-sex marriage and tried to justify this infringe-
ment on gay couples’ equality by inter alia arguing that such in-
fringement is justified by international law. This argument was 
unanimously rejected by the Constitutional Court for two reasons: 
(i) although international law does not specifically support same-
sex marriage, nothing in international law specifically excludes the 
possibility of same-sex marriage; (ii) although the Court must con-
sider international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights, it does 
not mean that the Bill of Rights must necessarily conform with in-
ternational law:85(para104) ‘It would be a strange reading of the Consti-
tution that utilised the principles of international human rights law 
to take away a guaranteed right.’
Although the Court in Fourie approached the international law 
vis-à-vis guaranteed right conflict from the angle of the interpre-
tation clause (section 39 of the Constitution that dictates that a 
court must consider international law when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights), I submit that the principle articulated in Fourie would be 
just as applicable to the same conflict when approached from the 
angle of international law qua purpose of the challenged limitation 
– the guaranteed right will trump international law.
6.2.1.4 Conclusion on international standards qua purpose of 
the limitation
The above arguments are not interdependent; each one offers a 
distinct ground why the purpose of attaining internationally recog-
nised standards of research cannot justify the limitation on privacy 
as per the extensive interpretation of section 56(1). The possible 
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contention that the extensive interpretation can be justified by this 
purpose can therefore be rejected with confidence.
6.2.2 Conclusion on limitation: propriety?
The only potential purpose for the limitation on privacy posed by 
the extensive interpretation of section 56(1) that could be gleaned 
from the Act itself (namely, international standards) has failed to 
justify such limitation. Is it possible to conceive of any other argu-
ment to limit privacy? Can a sense of propriety or morality qualify 
qua legitimate governmental purpose? The Court has made a clear 
distinction between the following two kinds of morality: (i) views 
of morality that, even though they may be popular in society, are 
not based on the Constitution;80(para113) and (ii) the morality that is 
embodied in the Constitution.79(para136) While the Court has made it 
abundantly clear that a limitation cannot be justified by the former 
kind of morality,80(para86),79(para37) the state can and must, however, 
enforce the latter, Constitutional morality.80(para105) When traditional 
notions of propriety regarding the use of gametes are eliminated 
from the equation, no objection to the private experiments in our 
case study can remain. I submit that there is nothing in the text 
and spirit of the Constitution that can conceivably be interpreted 
as reason for arguing for a limitation on the right to privacy in the 
context of the case study.
To pursue the point further: the enforcement of any moral posi-
tion that objects to the use of sperm as per the case study would 
be absurdly inconsistent in a society that tolerates – and in main-
stream youth culture celebrates – the destruction of gargantuan 
numbers of gametes for pure recreational sex. If the use (and in-
evitable destruction) of gametes is allowed for the private purpose 
of recreational sex, why not for the private purpose of studying it 
under a microscope? Such an inconsistency would be irrational 
and unjustifiable in an open society.86
I will conclude my analysis of the limitation of privacy by para-
phrasing the Court’s memorable dictum on privacy in Case v. Min-
ister of Safety and Security:87(para91) What I may choose to do with 
my own sperm in the privacy of my home is nobody’s business 
but mine.
6.3 Conclusion on the human rights dimensions
To encapsulate the human rights dimensions of section 56(1): 
The extensive interpretation of this section (namely, that all use of 
gametes outside the sphere of medical and dental research is pro-
hibited) poses an unjustifiable infringement of the right to privacy; 
the restrictive interpretation (namely, that outside the sphere of 
medical and dental research, the use of gametes is not prohibited) 
does not pose such infringement. The extensive interpretation is 
therefore untenable from a human rights perspective, while the 
restrictive interpretation would be acceptable.
7. Conclusion: a spirit of enquiry
In the discussion of the preamble above, I noted that I would return 
to the Act’s stated purpose of attaining a spirit of enquiry. Using 
this stated purpose qua interpretive aid provides a final, simple, 
yet powerful argument against the extensive interpretation: A spirit 
of enquiry, as embodied by the boy and his microscope in our case 
study, would be actively countered by the extensive interpretation. 
Although the restrictive interpretation is not the polar opposite of 
the extensive interpretation in the sense that it will actively pro-
mote a spirit of enquiry, it will at least passively allow it and is 
hence more proximate to the Act’s purpose of attaining a spirit of 
enquiry and therefore clearly the preferable interpretation.
At the beginning of the article, I posed the question: Is it le-
gal to use one’s own gametes, or other’s gametes with their con-
sent, for non-medical and non-sexual-intercourse purposes? We 
can now confidently conclude our discussion and answer that the 
relevant statutory provision, section 56(1) of the National Health 
Act, should be so interpreted as to allow the use of gametes for 
such purposes. If used as a test case for the solidity of the legal 
system’s commitment to freedom in South Africa, the result is tell-
ing, since the two possible interpretations of section 56(1) are ar-
chetypical in their exemplification of the freedom-propriety conflict 
– a conflict resolved in favour of freedom by both the common 
law presumptions of statutory interpretation, as well as the human 
rights analysis.
As illustrated by the case study, freedom is the essential ena-
bler of a spirit of enquiry, which in turn is the very key to scientific 
discovery and ultimately the improvement of the human condition. 
If we are a humane society – a society that strives towards the 
improvement of the human condition – we should guard freedom 
and award the spirit of enquiry.
8. Recommendation
To give expression to this conclusion and avoid any legal uncer-
tainty, the Department of Health should amend Regulation 4 of the 
Draft regulations on diagnostic testing, health research and thera-
peutics to read as follows: ‘DNA, RNA, cultured cells, amniocytes, 
stem cells, gametes, polar bodies, blastomeres and small tissue 
biopsies including single cells from developing blastocysts, may 
be removed or withdrawn from living persons and used, where 
such use is for medical or dental purposes, only for the following 
specific medical and dental purposes …’.
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